Many mergers are motivated by the existence of synergies between the merging …rms, yet they fail to achieve any synergies after merger completion. This paper presents a model of endogenous synergy creation and shows that expected synergies from a merger are realized only if the managers from the two merging …rms are willing to collaborate towards the creation of synergies. We show that incentives to collaborate are stronger in mergers combining …rms with complementary assets and resources, and …rms from complementary industries. Importantly, this result arises not because greater complementarities imply greater merger gains, but because greater complementarities lead to stronger incentives for managers to work together, increasing the endogenous success probability of achieving the expected synergies. Our model predicts that the likelihood of generating expected synergies is greater in mergers motivated by scope economies than in mergers motivated by scale economies. In addition, vertical mergers are more likely to succeed relative to horizontal mergers to the extent that merging …rms are likely to have greater asset and industry complementarity in vertical mergers. These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence in Rhodes- Kropf and Robinson (2008) and Hoberg and Phillips (2011) that asset complementarities and industry complementarities play an important role in value creation from mergers. Our paper also shows that the level of diversi…cation discount is smaller in conglomerates combining …rms from complementary industries, consistent with the recent evidence in Hoberg and Phillips (2011).
Introduction
One of the primary motivations for merger and acquisition (M&A) activity is to create and exploit synergies between the merging …rms. While researchers argue at length regarding the de…nition and measurement of merger synergies and merger success, they often agree about one point: far too few M&A deals deliver their expected synergies. In this paper, we argue that a high level of expected synergies ex ante may not be su¢ cient for successful creation and implementation of the expected synergies ex post. Expected synergies can be realized only if the merging …rms have the incentives to collaborate and work together towards the creation of the synergies. We show that incentives to collaborate, and the endogenous likelihood of achieving expected synergies depend on asset complementarities as well as industry complementarities between the merging …rms. This is not because of an assumption that greater complementarities imply greater synergies. It is because in mergers combining …rms with complementary assets, involvement of each merging …rm is essential to synergy creation. This reduces the expropriation concerns and enhances the incentives of the two …rms to collaborate in order to increase the success probability of achieving anticipated synergies from the merger. This result is consistent with the evidence in Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) and Hoberg and Phillips (2011) that asset and industry complementarities are an important driver of mergers and value creation from mergers.
In our model, we consider a two-divisional …rm formed through a merger where each division is run by a divisional manager. The managers either can choose to work independently with no information and knowledge sharing between them, or can choose to collaborate by combining and sharing their information and knowledge with each other. If each division works independently, no synergies are created and gained from the merger. If they collaborate, they can create synergies if their collaboration e¤ort succeeds. Conditional on collaboration, there are two stages for achieving expected synergies. In the …rst stage, managers exert e¤ort for creating synergies. If both managers'collaboration e¤ort succeeds, synergies can be realized in the second stage with the active participation of both managers. Collaborating for synergies has both costs and bene…ts for the managers. It is costly in the sense that if at least one of the manager's collaboration e¤ort fails, not only it is not possible to realize any synergy surplus, but also each manager experiences a dilution in the value of his own division. This is because working towards synergy creation with the other division requires each manager to divert resources and attention from his own division. The bene…t of collaboration is that, if both managers are successful in their collaboration e¤ort, it results in an increase in …rm value through a synergy surplus. However, the existence of a synergy surplus is not su¢ cient for the managers to be willing to collaborate. Their collaboration incentives critically depend on the extent to which each manager can internalize the surplus. Their ability to internalize the surplus, in turn, depends on how essential the participation of each manager is to the realization of the synergies during the second stage. If the merging …rms complement each other in terms of their human capital, skills and resources, the post-merger …rm needs both …rms and managers for the implementation of the synergies. Put di¤erently, the …rm experiences a larger loss in synergy surplus from retaining only one manager at the implementation stage and …ring the other one, the more complementary the two …rms are to each other. The greater need for each divisional manager leads to stronger incentives for them to collaborate and work towards synergies. Interestingly, from the …rm's perspective, stronger collaboration incentives come at a cost: the dependence on both managers for realizing the synergies reduces the portion of the synergy surplus extracted by the …rm. However, as long as collaboration incentives are su¢ ciently strong, the …rm bene…ts from the collaboration e¤ort of the managers through a higher success probability of achieving the synergy surplus.
Alternatively, if the merger combines homogenous …rms with low asset and industry complementarity, each merging …rm and manager would be less essential and critical in implementing the synergies, and would be more easily expropriated by the post-merger …rm. This is because the …rm's ability to realize the synergies by keeping only one manager and …ring the other one is greater the less complementary the managers are in terms of skill and knowledge they possess.
Lower complementarity leads to ex ante weaker incentives for managers to collaborate since each manager anticipates that his marginal value and contribution in the merged …rm will drop once the collaboration e¤ort succeeds and synergies are created. Hence, in such a merger, managers will not …nd it desirable to collaborate for synergies, and the merger will fail to achieve any synergies. Although this strategy leads to no synergy surplus, from the managers'perspective, there is no dilution in the value of each manager's own division. Focusing exclusively on his own division may be the optimal strategy for each manager especially when they anticipate that once they collaborate and create synergies, they will be expropriated by the …rm during the implementation of the synergies. Interestingly, it is possible that the managers choose to work independently without any collaboration even if the merger has a signi…cant synergy potential ex ante. This result implies that although some mergers are desirable from the shareholders' perspective conditional on the realization of expected synergies, it may not be possible to motivate the managers to work together, and the synergy potential of the merger remains unrealized.
The level of asset and industry complementarity in our model has implications for diversi…-cation discount. For su¢ ciently high values of complementarity, the two stand-alone …rms will …nd it optimal to merge, and the value of the post-merger …rm will be greater than the total value of the stand-alone …rms. Hence, the post-merger …rm will be valued at a premium relative to the stand-alone …rms. This result is consistent with the recent …nding in Hoberg and Phillips (2011) that conglomerates combining operations from complementary industries exhibit a lower diversi…cation discount and sometimes trade at a premium relative to stand-alone …rms.
Our model also shows that stand-alone …rms with greater pro…tability and growth prospects are less likely to undertake a merger. This is because the merger spreads the amount of scarce resources of the …rm too thinly over two divisions and a¤ects managerial incentives to work hard, and this ine¢ ciency turns out to be most costly when the pro…tability of the stand-alone …rm is greater. This result is consistent with the empirical …ndings related to diversi…cation discount.
In our model, …rms which choose to remain stand-alone are endogenously di¤erent from …rms choosing to undertake a merger in terms of their growth prospects, and they have a higher value compared to …rms undertaking a merger, without necessarily implying that mergers are ine¢ cient.
Hence, our paper provides a rational explanation for the diversi…cation discount puzzle, and consistent with the self-selection arguments in Campa and Kedia (2002), and Villalonga (2004) .
Our paper is related to the property rights theory of the …rm (Grossman and Hart (1986) , Moore (1990) and ). One of the important messages from the property rights theory of the …rm is that when contracts are incomplete, complementary assets should be owned by the same …rm to minimize the negative e¤ect of the hold-up problem on incentives to undertake relation speci…c investment. In our paper, combining …rms with complementary human capital and resources leads to a greater success probability for the merger to realize its synergy potential. This is because the manager of each party in the merger is essential to the realization of synergies, and is less concerned about being held-up by the post-merger …rm once merger synergies are created.
Our paper is also related to the theory of the …rm and internal capital markets. Existing work in these areas considers the advantages and disadvantages of …rms with a large number of divisions (see, among others, Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994) . We present a new bene…t of having divisions with complementary assets in terms of improving divisional incentives to collaborate. In our model, whether one division complements another division is a key driver of whether the divisions …nd it optimal to collaborate and whether having two divisions in a …rm is value-enhancing or not.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our basic model. In Section 3
we analyze the basic model where we examine managerial incentives to collaborate. In Section 4, we analyze the …rm's merger decision based on managerial incentives to work towards synergy creation. 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
We have a two-divisional …rm formed through a merger where each division is managed by a divisional manager. Firm value depends on managerial e¤ort. Value creation takes place over two periods. During the …rst period, each manager exerts e¤ort which determines his success probability. Conditional on managers'being successful in their e¤ort, the corporate headquarters (CHQ) makes a resource allocation decision which determines value creation. Both the …rm and the managers are risk-neutral and, the managers are wealth-constrained. There are four dates in our economy, with no discounting.
At t = 0, divisional managers can choose to work together towards creation of synergies or to work independently from each other with no potential for synergies.
If the managers choose to work independently with no potential for synergy creation, at
which determines his success probability.
The parameter k measures the cost of exerting e¤ort, with k > 1. There are three possible states of the world. The …rst one is where both managers succeed. The second one is where one manager succeeds and one fails. The third one is where both managers fail. If both managers succeed and if both of them are successful at the end of the …rst period, they need resources from the Corporate Headquarters (CHQ) to create value. Conditional on the CHQ allocating its scarce resources to each division, each division generates payo¤ x > 0: The CHQ also has the option to close down one of the divisions and continue with only one division by allocating all its resources to that division. In such a situation, the division divested generates payo¤ 0 while the division which receives all the resources from the CHQ generates payo¤ 2x: If only one of the managers succeed in the …rst stage, the CHQ allocates all its resources to the successful division which generates payo¤ 2x, and the division of the manager who fails generates 0 payo¤. Finally, if both managers fail, both divisions generate payo¤ 0:
If the managers choose to collaborate and work together, at t = 1, manager i exerts e¤ort
which determines his success probability. There are three possible states of the world as before. If both managers succeed in their e¤ort and if the CHQ decides to allocate its resources over the two divisions, both divisions together generate payo¤ s > 0: We assume that s > 2x implying that the two divisions create more value together if their managers choose to collaborate and succeed. As in the case where the managers choose to work independently without any collaboration, the CHQ can still choose to keep only one division if both managers succeed. Speci…cally, if the CHQ continues only one division and closes down the other division, the value generated is given by s with 0 1. This implies that the extent to which the CHQ can create synergies with keeping only one division depends on the value of . If = 0, for instance, both managers/divisions are essential to the realization of synergies, and the CHQ has to keep both divisions alive in order to realize the full value of synergies.
If only one of the managers succeeds and if his division receives all the resources from the CHQ, his division generates payo¤ 2dx with d < 1: The assumption that d < 1 captures the notion that collaborating with the other division and working towards synergies is costly for each division in the sense that in case the collaboration e¤ort does not work for both managers, that is, one manager fails, the successful manager's division generates a lower value than if the manager chooses to focus only on his division and does not follow the collaboration option.
Hence, compared to the case where the managers work independently, collaboration is pro…table in case both managers are successful given that s > 2x, it is costly if one of the managers fails in his collaboration e¤ort. Put di¤erently, realization of synergies is conditional on both managers being successful together, and the possibility that one of the managers may fail imposes a cost on the successful manager as well.
Finally, if both managers fail, both divisions generate 0 payo¤.
We assume that contracts are incomplete in the sense that it is not feasible to contract ex-ante on the participation of either the managers or the CHQ to the second period of the value creation cycle. 1 The division of the total surplus between the CHQ and the managers is determined through bargaining at the interim stage at t = 2 .
We characterize the payo¤s that result from bargaining between the CHQ and the manager(s)
by using the notion of Shapley value (see Myerson, 1991, and Winter, 2002) . Based on this solution concept, each player obtains the expected value of his marginal contribution to all coalitions that can be formed with all other players engaged in bargaining.
To obtain the Shapley value, we …rst need to de…ne the set of players engaged in the bargaining process denoted by N . The Shapley value is then obtained as follows. Let C be a possible (sub)coalition of players from the set of all players engaged in bargaining N , that is, C N . Let T (C) be the total payo¤ that can be obtained by the players in C if they cooperate, that is, by the (sub)coalition C N , with T (?) = 0. The Shapley value for player i 2 N , denoted by v i , is then given by
Intuitively, the Shapley value re ‡ects the notion that each player's payo¤ from bargaining depends on the player's marginal contribution to the total payo¤, given what the other players can obtain by themselves or by forming subcoalitions.
At t = 3, the payo¤ from the project is realized and distributed between the CHQ and the manager(s).
Model Analysis 2.1.1 No collaboration between divisions
When the managers choose to work independently, bargaining payo¤s for the CHQ and the managers depend on whether only one or both managers have a successful outcome at the …rst period, t = 2: There are three di¤erent possible cases (states of the world): (i) both managers are successful in the …rst period SS; (ii) one manager is successful while the other one fails, state SF; (iii) both managers fail, state F F .
In the simplest case where both managers fail, state , is given by
The surplus allocation between the CHQ and the manager(s), that is, their Shapley value, is then determined as follows. If the CHQ has only one successful division, state SF , the set of bargaining players is given by the CHQ and the successful manager, say manager i, yielding N = fCHQ; M i g. In this case, the CHQ can allocate all its resources to division i, which generates 2x. Thus, the total payo¤ of the coalition formed by the CHQ and manager i is 
If both managers are successful at t = 2, state SS, the CHQ engages in a process of (multilateral) bargaining with both managers. In this case, the set of bargaining players is given by the CHQ and the two managers, yielding N = fCHQ; M 1 ; M 2 g. If the CHQ keeps both divisions, the coalition of the CHQ and the managers yields x + x = 2x, implying that 
Comparing CHQ's payo¤ in the SS and in the SF states reveals that the CHQ obtains a greater payo¤ when both managers are successful due to his ability to allocate all his resources to only one division. This ability gives him a stronger bargaining position and allows him to obtain a greater payo¤ in the SS state than in the SF state although in both states the total payo¤ obtained remains the same.
We now analyze the e¤ort choice of the managers. Manager i determines his e¤ort level p i by maximizing his expected pro…t I M i
. By substituting the Shapley values (5) and (7) into the manager's expected pro…t given by (3), we obtain that the e¤ort level p i is determined by
Similarly, by substituting the Shapley values 4) and (6) into the CHQ's expected pro…t (2), we
The …rst-order condition of (9) is
Setting p I j = p I i ;and solving the …rst order condition for p I i yields equilibrium level of e¤ort denoted by p I :
Substituting p I j = p I i = p I into (9) and (10) yields the expected pro…ts of the divisional managers and the CHQ as follows:
Collaboration between divisions
If the two managers choose to collaborate to create synergies, manager i exerts e¤ort p C i . If both managers succeed in their e¤ort and if the CHQ allocates resources to each division, the …rm value is given by s with s > 2x. The assumption s > 2x implies that conditional on both managers being successful, collaboration generates higher payo¤ due to synergies compared to each manager working independently. As before, there are three di¤erent possible cases (states of the world): (i) both managers are successful in the …rst period SS; (ii) one manager is successful while the other one fails, state SF; 2 (iii) both managers fail, state F F .
In the simplest case where both managers fail, state F F , both divisions are terminated and all agents obtain zero payo¤s. De…ne the Shapley value in state SS and SF for the CHQ and
(SF )g, respectively. The CHQ's expected pro…t, C CHQ , is then given by
and manager i's expected pro…t,
, is given by
The surplus allocation between the CHQ and the manager(s), that is, their Shapley value, is determined as follows. In SF where only one of the managers is successful, the set of bargaining players is given by the CHQ and the successful manager, say manager i, yielding N = fCHQ; M i g.
In this case, the CHQ can allocate all its resources to division i, which generates 2dx. Thus, the total payo¤ of the coalition formed by the CHQ and manager i is 
In state SS both managers are successful, and the CHQ engages in a process of (multilateral) bargaining with both managers. In this case, the set of bargaining players is given by the CHQ and the two managers, yielding N = fCHQ; M 1 ; M 2 g. If the CHQ keeps both divisions, the coalition of the CHQ and the managers yields s, implying that 
Note that while the CHQ's payo¤ increases in ; the managers' payo¤ decreases in it. This is because is a measure of the CHQ's ability to realize synergies created in the …rst period with only one division manager. Hence, as his ability to do so increases, he extracts a greater portion of the synergy value created.
We now analyze the e¤ort choice of the managers. (16), we obtain that the e¤ort level p i is determined by
Similarly, by substituting the Shapley values (17) and (19) into the CHQ's expected pro…t (15),
The …rst-order condition of (21) is
5It is interesting to note that when s(1 ) > 3dx, manager i 0 s e¤ort is increasing in manager j 0 s e¤ort. This is in contrast to what we have when the managers choose to work independently with no collaboration where manager i's e¤ort level is always decreasing in manager j's e¤ort level.
Setting p C j = p C i ;and solving the …rst order condition for p C i yields equilibrium level of e¤ort denoted by p C : (21) and (22) yields the expected pro…ts of the divisional managers and the CHQ as follows:
From (24) and (25), is is straightforward to see that both managerial e¤ort and the managers' expected pro…ts are decreasing in . This is not surprising since measures the CHQ's ability to realize the synergies with participation of only one divisional manager. Since the managers anticipate that they will be expropriated at the bargaining stage when is high, they exert lower e¤ort and obtain lower expected pro…ts for higher values of : What is less immediate is the e¤ect of on the CHQ's expected pro…ts. On one hand, the CHQ can extract a greater portion of the synergy surplus for higher values of . On the other hand, however, a higher implies a lower probability for the creation of synergies given that managerial e¤ort decreases in . Trading of these two e¤ects, it is possible that the expected pro…ts of the CHQ may decrease in , as presented in the following lemma.
An interesting implication of this lemma is that mergers combining …rms with di¤erent and complementary set of assets and skills may be more desirable from the shareholders point of view.
In such mergers, each merging …rm is essential not only to the creation but also the realization of synergies. This reduces their concern about being expropriated during the realization stage of the synergies once they work towards creating the synergies. Hence, this result suggests that horizontal mergers combining homogenous …rms are less likely to succeed in terms of synergy creation compared to vertical mergers combining …rms with distinct and complementary resources and skills.
We now turn our attention to understand managerial incentives to collaborate or work independently with no collaboration between their divisions by comparing their expected pro…ts from each strategy. Proposition 1 suggests that the managers will be willing to collaborate for synergies only if the value of is su¢ ciently low. Recall that measures the extent of the synergies that the CHQ can achieve with only one of the managers conditional on the managers being successful on the creation of synergies. In other words, high value of implies that once the managers are successful in creating synergies by working together, each manager's contribution to the realization of the synergies is lower. Anticipating that they will be expropriated by the CHQ for high values of , the managers would be willing to collaborate and work towards creation of synergies only if is su¢ ciently low.
Proposition 2
M C is increasing in s and d;and decreasing in x.
Proposition 2 implies that managerial incentives to collaborate are stronger in mergers with a greater synergy potential. In addition, the managers are more willing to collaborate towards synergies when the cost of doing so in terms of dilution in their own divisions in case they fail at their collaboration e¤ort is lower, that is, when d is higher. Finally, collaboration incentives are weaker when payo¤ x the managers can generate from their own division is higher. This is because the extent of dilution the managers experience in their own division in case they fail to generate synergies is greater for higher values of x. This may suggest that in mergers combining standalone …rms with higher growth opportunities, it will be more di¢ cult to motivate collaboration e¤ort from the merging parties.
Since in our model, the managers decide to collaborate for synergies only if they obtain greater expected pro…ts from doing so compared to working independently, one may expect that this decision has important e¢ ciency implications. For instance, it may be possible that for high values of , managerial incentives to collaborate could be weaker even though collaboration has a great synergy potential and it is e¢ cient in terms of the maximization of the expected pro…ts of the managers and the CHQ. In other words, it could be possible that although from the shareholders'perspective the merger creates value, from the managers'perspective collaboration would not be the desired choice. The following proposition presents the conditions under which the managers do not collaborate for synergies and the CHQ experiences no synergy gains. 1 4 and s(4 1) 2x, although collaboration is desirable from the shareholders' perspective, the managers choose not to to collaborate and no synergies is created.
Proposition 3 If
As Proposition 3 shows, the managers do not …nd it desirable to collaborate when is su¢ -ciently high given that a high implies that although they are essential at the synergy creation stage, they are less essential at the synergy implementation place. From the shareholders'perspective the collaboration outcome is desirable when the potential for synergies and the CHQ's ability to implement the synergies are large. However, the lack of incentives for the managers would lead to no synergy gains for the CHQ.
Having examined managerial incentives to collaborate and create synergies, we now turn our attention to the merger decision ex ante. In the next section, we analyze a stand-alone …rm's incentives to merge with another …rm based on its expectations about whether the managers will have su¢ cient incentives to collaborate and hence, the merger will lead to synergy creation.
The Merger Decision
In this section, we examine the incentives of a stand-alone …rm to merge with another …rm and become a two divisional …rm where each division is run by a manager. As before, the value of the …rm depends on managerial e¤ort and resources contributed by the CHQ of the …rm in case managerial e¤ort succeeds. The manager exerts e¤ort p S in the …rst stage, and if successful and receives resources from the CHQ, …rm value is given by 2x. Note that, as opposed to the case where we have a two-divisional …rm in the previous sections, when the …rm has only one division, the CHQ allocates all its resources to its only division, and the division generates payo¤ 2x: In addition, since the CHQ has only one division, it does not have any bargaining power in terms of allocating its resources to another division. This allows the manager to extract a greater surplus, compared to each divisional managers in the two divisional …rm.
If the managerial e¤ort succeeds, using Shapley values, we obtain that the manager and the CHQ obtains payo¤ x: In anticipation of his expected payo¤, the manager sets his e¤ort to maximize his expected pro…ts S M given by
It is immediate to show that managerial e¤ort is given by p S x k : Similarly, the expected pro…ts of the manager S M and the CHQ S CHQ are given respectively by
S CHQ
The …rm takes its decision to undertake a merger by comparing its stand-alone pro…ts given in (29) with those from the merger given in (14) or (26), depending on whether the merger leads to synergy creation or not. The following proposition characterizes the …rm's optimal merger decision.
Proposition 4 a) The stand-alone …rm …nds it optimal to undertake a merger if and only if
where x M 1 and x M 2 are de…ned in the Appendix. b)
As Proposition 4 shows, the stand-alone …rm …nds it optimal to undertake a merger only for su¢ ciently low values of x. The intuition for this result is that the having two divisions after the merger has a negative e¤ect on managerial incentives for two reasons. First, when the CHQ allocates its …xed amount resources over two divisions, it dilutes the value potential of each division. Second, after managerial e¤ort is observed, the CHQ has a bargaining advantage due to his ability to shift resources from one division to another. His ability to do is greater when the divisions are less complementary to each other and synergy loss is small from …ring one of the divisional managers. Interestingly, these negative e¤ects on incentives are the stronger when the value potential x of each division is greater. Hence, for high values of x; which may be interpreted as a proxy of how pro…table the stand-alone …rm's business is, the …rm does not …nd it optimal to undertake a merger. When the pro…t and growth potential of the stand-alone business is lower, the …rm …nds it optimal to undertake a merger. The desire for the merger is greater when the synergy potential of the merger is greater, implied by ; the …rm's willingness to undertake the merger increases as decreases, implied by 
Diversi…cation Discount
Proposition 4 suggests that a stand-alone …rm …nds it optimal to merge only if its value potential
given by x is su¢ ciently low. This is because adding a new division to the …rm through a merger leads to weaker managerial incentives unless the synergy potential of the merger is su¢ ciently large and managerial incentives to work towards creation of synergies are su¢ ciently strong.
This observation implies that stand-alone …rms with lower pro…tability would be more likely to undertake a merger than stand-alone …rms with higher pro…tability, and hence, …rms undertaking a merger would be endogenously di¤erent from …rms choosing to remain stand-alone. This line of reasoning is consistent with the empirical …ndings that diversi…ed …rms trade at a discount relative to stand-alone …rms. As our model implies, this …nding may not necessarily suggest that undertaking a merger is ine¢ cient, but can be explained by the possibility of a selection bias that only …rms with su¢ ciently low pro…tability would …nd it desirable to undertake a merger.
When we compare their value after the merger to the value of …rms which remain stand-alone, it is possible that stand-alone …rms will have a higher …rm value without necessarily implying that the decision to merge for …rms undertaking a merger is ine¢ cient. The following proposition presents this intuition formally.
Proposition 5 Consider two stand-alone …rms, …rm A and …rm B characterized respectively with parameters x A and x B :Suppose M C ; x A > x M 2 while x B < x M 2 so that it is optimal for …rm A to remain stand-alone while it is optimal for …rm B to undertake a merger. The value of …rm A will be greater than the value of …rm B after its merger.
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine managerial incentives in a two-divisional …rm to collaborate and create merger synergies. Creation of synergies is possible only if the divisions …nd it desirable to work together. The desire to do so critically depends on how essential each division is for implementing the synergies once they are created. A greater need for each division to realize merger synergies yields a greater merger surplus for each division, and hence increases divisional incentives to collaborate for synergy creation. If, on the other hand, divisions are substitutes to each other and each division is less needed in the presence of the other similar division, incentives to collaborate will be weaker as well as the potential for the merger to generate merger synergies.
Our model predicts that the success probability of generating expected synergies is greater in mergers motivated by scope economies than in mergers motivated by scale economies. In addition, vertical mergers are more likely to succeed relative to horizontal mergers to the extent that merging parties are more likely to be complements than substitutes in such mergers. Finally, our paper provides a rational explanation for the diversi…cation discount found in empirical studies.
In our model, there is self-selection in the sense that …rms with greater pro…tability remain to stay stand-alone while …rms with lower pro…tability and growth prospects choose to undertake a merger. Although the decision to merge is not ine¢ cient, stand-alone …rms have higher value than …rms undertaking a merger. hence, S A;CHQ > C B;CHQ :
